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ABSTRACT 
 
 
With a globalised system, the credit crunch of 2007/2008 rippled through the global 
economy quickly and turned a global financial crisis into a global economic crisis, 
vulnerabilities in the economy surfaced when it hit and these still continue to plague 
South Africa today. According to the World Bank, South Africa’s real GDP growth 
estimates are 0.8% in 2016/2017 and 1.1% in 2017/2018. Increasing uncertainty in global 
financial markets and banking systems, sharp declines in commodity prices, subdued 
global trade, currency pressure, as well as domestic constraints such as a current account 
deficit, a negative inflation outlook and high levels of unemployment, lead to increased 
financial stress in South Africa making the country more vulnerable in the event of an 
adverse scenario. Clearly, being cognizant of determinants of financial stress in South 
Africa is of paramount importance to policy makers as it allows them to assess potential 
risks to financial system stability and to consider timely and appropriate counteractions 
while maintaining a financial system that is resilient to systemic shocks.  (South African 
Reserve Bank Financial Stability Review, 2016) 
 
This study aims to construct a financial stress index using Principal Component Analysis 
to identify key determinants of financial stress in South Africa. Several variables that 
have been identified in standing literature as being able to capture certain symptoms of 
financial strain in emerging market economies are estimated then aggregated into an 
index using the principal component analysis method. The usefulness of the index in 
identifying past crises is then assessed, moreover its performance is contrasted against the 
financial stress index constructed by South African Reserve Bank as well as against a 
South African composite business cycle leading indicator. Finally, the ability of the index 
to predict economic activity is examined. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Motivation of study 
Financial stress refers to episodes where economic agents are subjected to extreme 
uncertainty and varying expectations of loss in financial markets (Park & Mercado, 2014). 
South Africa has experienced several financial stress episodes in the post-apartheid era 
which have been clearly documented. The drivers of financial stress, their causal 
relationships and spill over effects are of prime substance to comprehend and scrutinise 
for the purposes of maintaining financial stability and competiveness of the country, as 
financial strain exacerbates the conditions in an already constrained economy (Park & 
Mercado, 2014). Further, the tension resulting from shakiness in the financial system can 
feed through to macroeconomic instabilities and lead to further deterioration in the 
solidity of the financial system. The key objective of this study is to observe drivers of 
stress in the South African financial system and then construct an index that has the 
ability to not only capture financial strain but also predict some level economic activity 
for South Africa.  
 
1.1.1 Key Questions  
 Is it optimal considering the ongoing episodes in the financial industry to create 
an index that captures known episodes of financial stress in South Africa by using 
a variation of variables that have been proven to capture stress in other emerging 
markets? 
 If so, can this index’s performance be compared to the South African Reserve 
Bank’s index in capturing historic crisis events? 
 How well does the South African financial stress index track the composite leading 
business cycle indicator? 
 If the above questions are optimally answered, can the proposed financial stress 
index predict key indicators of economic activity within the South African domain? 
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The idea of financial stability, its predictability and causes is evolving. To date, as the 
literature review below reveals, it is still an open field for policy and research. It is upon 
this need that this study goes out to try and generate specific macro-financial indicators 
for South Africa to benchmark against those that are currently employed by the South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB). Principal Component Analysis is used to construct the 
South African Financial Stress Index (SAFSI), by employing a variation of variables that 
have empirically demonstrated the ability to encapsulate crucial aspects of financial 
strain in developing economies. These variables have been used with success in few 
emerging market studies including Turkey, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Russia as explored by Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kenc (2013), Danninger, Tytell, 
Balakrishnan, and Elekdag (2009) and Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kutan (2013). They 
incorporate five essential elements: banking sector frailty, time varying stock market 
return volatility, external debt, sovereign debt and an exchange market pressure index. 
Because the nature of a recession in a particular country can be shaped by many factors, 
an examination is carried out to determine whether these pre-selected variables are 
applicable in a South African context. The examination focuses on the period of January 
1997 – June 2016 with the intention that the South African stress index spans a decade 
earlier than the South African Reserve Bank’s financial stress index (SARBFSI). Crisis 
events are rare therefore the wider the range of data, the bigger the bank of crisis events 
that can be used to test the viability of the newly constructed index and to assess its 
performance. The SARBFSI’s period of observation is January 2006 – January 2015 
therefore the SAFSI extends over a decade longer than the SARBFSI. 
1.1.2 The benchmark 
The Central Bank of South Africa is tasked with protecting and enhancing financial 
stability in the Republic of South Africa. The recent financial crisis made clear the 
significance of understanding and gauging systemic risks (South African Reserve Bank 
Financial Stability Review, 2016) this being so, there is a need to be aware of the factors 
that would precisely cause instability or any possible systemic risk in the financial system 
in South Africa. 
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To this end, SARB constructed a financial stress index (FSI) which uses five broad 
indicators as a base to create a general and simple index to quantify vulnerability in a 
financial system (South African Reserve Bank Financial Stability Review, 2016).  The 
SARBFSI was formulated as an aggregated index that involves two-level construction 
processes that use variance-equal weight techniques across indicators It is derived from 
five financial markets (represented by a selection of variables) which are notable sources 
of funding for banks, namely the markets for credit, funding, equity, foreign exchange 
and real estate. The variables selected for calculation of the SARBFSI are as follows: 
Government bond spread,  Interbank liquidity spread,  Cost of borrowing , Treasury yield 
spread (Funding) ; CMAX60: All-share Index , VIX (Equity) ;  US dollar/rand volatility 
index , Euro/rand volatility index; Sovereign bond spread (Foreign exchange) and CMAX: 
Absa House Price Index ,CMAX: Commercial real property prices (Real Estate) – a total 
of eleven variables. The performance of the SAFSI is compared to that of SARB’s FSI with 
the purpose of determining which index captures stress events better. 
 
1.1.3 Structure of thesis 
Chapter one gives and introduction and motivation for the study while chapter two gives 
an overview of significant literature that has been published regarding this topic. Chapter 
three opens with a discussion about the methodology, which describes the broad 
underpinning of this study’s chosen method - principal component analysis (PCA) and 
follows with a summary of how the Vector AutoRegression model will be applied along 
with Granger Causality hypothesis which will interpret results, it follows with motivation 
for the selection of proxies that are used to represent each pre-selected variable that 
encapsulate facets of financial strain and presents a preliminary assessment of data as 
well as details the aggregation of components that are used to construct the SAFSI. 
Chapter four gives empirical result and weighs up the performance of the SAFSI against 
the SARBFSI as well as against the composite leading business cycle indicator and 
explores the link between financial stress and economic activity is examined. To close, 
chapter five gives a conclusion and recommendation. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Financial stress indices 
The literature on financial stress determinants is vast, the majority of this taking place in 
advanced economies. Vašíček et al. (2017) identified factors that have predictive power of 
financial stress for 25 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries; they then use the Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to 
identify leading indicators of stress. BMA is a procedure that allows a subset of the most 
useful leading indicators of financial stress to be selected from a set of all possible 
combinations of potential leading indicators. The authors use these indicators as 
explanatory variables in a panel model for all countries and in models at the individual 
country level. The result is that panel models barely accounts for FSI dynamics and a 
better outcome is achieved in country models. They also find that financial tension is 
hard to foresee out of sample despite reasonably good in-sample performance..  
 
Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) built an FSI for the United States and studied its interactions 
with real activity, inflation and monetary policy using Markov-switching VAR model 
(MS-VAR model), estimated with Bayesian methods. Their results show when stress 
events come into the economy, they cause it havoc yet monetary policy is ineffectual for 
the duration of the financial turmoil.  
 
The paper by Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholtz, and Watson (2010) studies the 
interconnectedness between financial conditions and economic activity by constructing a 
new financial conditions index that features three key innovations besides interest rates 
and asset prices - a broad range of quantitative and survey-based indicators. Second, they 
make use of unbalanced panel estimation techniques results in a longer time series (back 
to 1970) than available for other indexes. Third, they control for past GDP growth and 
inflation and thus focus on the predictive power of financial conditions for future 
economic activity. The result is that their financial conditions index exhibits a stronger 
connection with future economic activity than existing indexes.  
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Lall, Cardarelli, and Elekdag (2009) construct a financial stress index in banking, 
securities and foreign exchange markets in 17 advanced economies over a period of 30 
years referencing a bank of 113 financial stress episodes. They find that recessions that 
are followed a banking-sector related downturn are likely to continue for up to four times 
longer than otherwise and that cumulative losses that are incurred are up to three times 
more severe. The authors also find that arm’s length financial systems have intensified 
the susceptibility of sharp contractions in economic activity if and when banking-related 
stress strikes but that arm’s length financial systems are not necessarily more prone to 
stress. Additionally, signals that precede financial stress and also indicate that financial 
stress will lead to economic downturn include: a mounting aggregate credit, rising house 
prices, greater dependence on borrowing by non-financial corporations and size of 
financial imbalances in the household sector.  
 
Oet, Eiben, Bianco, Gramlich, and Ong (2011) express a financial stress index for the 
United States based on daily public market data collected from four sectors of the 
financial markets – credit markets, foreign exchange markets, equity markets, and 
interbank markets. A dynamic weighting method is employed to capture changes in the 
relative importance of these four sectors as they occur. To boot, the design of the index 
allows the origin of the stress to be identified. The authors compare their index to 
alternative indexes using a detailed benchmarking methodology and show how their 
index can be applied to systemic stress monitoring and early warning system design. 
 
Duca and Peltonen (2013) also developed an FSI that is able to identify the starting date 
of systemic financial crises. The index uses discrete choice models that combine both 
domestic and global indicators of macro-financial vulnerabilities to predict systemic 
financial crises. The author’s analysis shows that combining indicators of domestic and 
global macro-financial vulnerabilities markedly improves the models’ ability to forecast 
systemic financial crises. Our framework also displays a good out-of-sample performance 
in predicting the ongoing Global Financial Crisis. 
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Implementation of the correct intervention policy in time of crisis can ease the transition 
from a stressful period to a calmer period. That is why several studies are dedicated to the 
subject. In some developed economies, Central Banks increase money supply by printing 
notes and thus increasing the amount of currency in circulation. They then go into the 
market and entice commercial banks to sell their bonds at a high price which they 
willingly do because it gives them higher revenues, the bank will then use these revenues 
to issue debt thereby injecting liquidity, reducing interest rates and kick starting 
economic growth. This unconventional monetary policy is known as quantitative easing 
which the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve, implemented several rounds of 
following the global financial crisis of 2007-08. More recently, the Bank of Japan and the 
European Central Bank have implemented quantitative easing. 
 
 
The SARB on the other hand has yet to face a crisis of comparable magnitude to the crisis 
of 2007-2008. In 1998 however, the contagion from turmoil in East Asia coupled with 
intense pressure on the rand resulted in an economic downturn that prompted the SARB 
to intervene, first the central bank borrowed foreign currency in the forward market and 
sold it in the spot market in an effort to halt pressure on the rand. As a result, the net 
open foreign position (i.e., net international reserves minus forward liabilities of the 
central bank) declined by $10 billion between April and September 1998. Second, by 
increasing interest rates by 7% in real terms as per Bhundia and Ricci (2005). However 
this action was ineffective and proved to be detrimental to investment and growth. In 
2001, facing another economic downturn the SARB chose not to intervene which was a 
more successful strategy. Subsequently, the SARB adopted an inflation-targeting policy; 
its primary objective is to maintain price stability. The South African Central Bank’s 
approach to financial stability maintenance places confidence in market forces to manage 
stability which means there is barely any intervention.  
 
 
12 
 
Li and St-Amant (2010), Baxa, Horváth, and Vašíček (2013) and Van Roye (2011) all direct 
their studies towards developed economies focusing on different crises and they all 
acknowledge the need for prescription measures that are different from usual as 
heightened levels of financial stress. 
 
The financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis have shown that financial 
stress may be an important driver for economic activity. It is off the back of this, that Van 
Roye (2011) derives a financial stress index for Germany, using a dynamic approximate 
factor model that summarizes a stress component of various financial variables. 
Subsequently, the author analyses the effects of financial stress on economic activity in a 
threshold vector autoregressive model. The result is that that if the index exceeds a 
certain threshold, an increase in financial stress causes economic activity to decelerate 
significantly, whereas if it is below this threshold, economic activity remains nearly 
unaffected. 
 
2.2 Transmission of financial stress  
Financial stress transmission to economic variables has also been paid much attention to, 
Claessens, Köse, and Terrones (2008) study the connection between macroeconomic and 
financial indicators in times of recession and financial stress for 21 OECD countries; they 
take cycles of GDP as measures of economic activity and credit, house prices and equity 
prices as financial indicators. They conclude that in periods of low output levels/GDP, 
house and equity prices and the growth rate of credit disintegrate. Equity prices are the 
most volatile in terms of intensity and duration of degeneration and recessionary periods 
that the countries have in common are strongly related with those of the United States.  
 
Vermeulen, Hoeberichts, Vašíček, Žigraiová, Šmídková & de Haan (2015) find that 
recessions that are a result of banking-related financial stress are more inclined to last at 
least twice as long as recessions which are not predicated by financial stress , not 
surprisingly Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) argue that in emerging market economies a 
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banking related crisis could lead to a downturn as severe as the Great Depression of 1929. 
This is because banking crises are usually associated with systemic risk: “near perfect 
correlation of indices that is becomes difficult to diversify and hedge portfolios” an effect 
so destabilising it could lead to the collapse of financial markets. 
 
Financial stress, defined as periods of impaired financial intermediation, is transmitted 
from advanced to emerging economies using a new financial stress index for emerging 
economies Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag, and Tytell (2011). The authors show that a 
previous financial crisis in advanced economies passes through powerfully and quickly to 
emerging economies. The unprecedented spike in financial stress in advanced economies 
elevated stress across emerging economies above levels seen during the Asian crisis but 
with significant cross-country variation. The extent of spill over of financial stress is 
correlated to the depth of financial linkages between advanced and emerging economies. 
 
 2.3 Construction of a financial stress index 
Cardarelli, Elekdag, and Lall (2011) use an equal variance weighted average technique to 
build their index to explore the reasons why financial stress occurrences result in 
economic recessions by studying the nature of explanatory variables at the onset of a 
decline in economic activity. Vermeulen et al. (2015) assembles a FSI which is an un-
weighted sum of standardised variables for 28 OECD countries and tests its predictive 
power; the result is that there is an insubstantial link between the onset of a financial 
crisis and the FSI. Although the correlation between a crisis and sub-indices, markedly 
the banking crisis, is substantial it means that policymakers should bear in mind that a 
FSI has limited usefulness as a predictor of a crisis. 
 
The aggregation of components and construction of the FSI is wide and varied. Illing and 
Liu (2006) developed an index to measure the degree of financial stress for the Canadian 
financial system using factor analysis, equal weights, economic weights and cumulative 
distribution functions. Vašíček et al. (2017) used the Bayesian model averaging (BMA) to 
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identify leading indicators of stress. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) employed portfolio theory 
based aggregation schemes that take into account correlation structure of stress 
indicators in order to quantify the level of systemic stress. Cardarelli et al. (2011) 
constructed their index using a variance equal weighting procedure while  Vermeulen et 
al. (2015) built a FSI which is an un-weighted sum of standardised variables. 
 
The SARBFSI was formulated as an aggregated index that involves two-level construction 
processes that use variance-equal weight techniques across indicators. Variables are 
standardised before they are aggregated so that only deviations from the mean explain 
the movements in the SARBFSI. It is constructed for the period January 2006 – January 
2015 on a monthly frequency and selects proxies of five dominants markets – credit, 
funding, equity, foreign exchange and real estate. Each market has an average of three 
proxies that serve as explanatory sub-indices for the main index. 
 
It is clear that there has been a vast array of studies dedicated to financial turmoil in 
developed economies all aimed at alleviating its impact and counteracting its effects on 
the economy. Park and Mercado (2014) explore the conduits of financial transmission in 
emerging market economies from stress emanating in developed economies, their study 
highlights that globalisation and interconnectedness of financial systems implies that 
stress that emanates from regions outside of a of a particular country, can lead to local 
financial strain. They also give insight on the phenomena of spill over effects.  
 
The criteria of which variables fort a part of the index is based on which features of 
financial stress that is explained by each variable, there is still a lot of are not vastly 
different between developed economies and emerging market economies. The study 
considers the uniqueness of developing markets and relies on variables that are have 
been empirically proven to have explanatory power to financial stress conditions in 
emerging markets, Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kutan (2013), Park and Mercado (2014), 
Danninger, M. S., Tytell, I., Balakrishnan, R., & Elekdag, S. (2009) and Cevik, Dibooglu, 
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and Kenc (2013) use a variation of these to explain financial stress. Cevik, Dibooglu, and 
Kutan (2013) construct a financial stress index for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Russia and Turkey amongst others in addition to that, they examine 
the association between financial stress and economic movement. These five key 
variables (banking sector frailty, time varying stock market return volatility, external 
debt, sovereign debt and an exchange market pressure index) seemingly capture key 
aspects of financial stress in sample countries. It is on the back of this as well as economic 
intuition that are the same variables are considered when the SAFSI is aggregated. 
 
Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kenc (2013) create a financial stress index by utilising leading 
indicators of stress in Turkey. They constructed a Turkish FSI by considering a variation 
of the variable above moreover, they included ‘trade credit’ and ‘credit stress’ as additional 
sources of financial stress in their particular FSI because as they have influence in the 
Turkish economy. The outcome is that the FSI is quite accomplished in signalling 
cumulative economic activity and has explanatory power over all recessions in Turkey. 
 
Hollo, Kremer, and Lo Duca (2012) observed that important financial stability variables 
for the European Central Bank emanate majorly from the core monetary policy factors 
including a measure of aggregate price levels, aggregate economic activity and 
aggregate short term interest rates. They find that the index Composite Indicator of 
Systemic Stress (European Central Bank’s financial stress index) possesses explanatory 
power for standard macroeconomic variables like inflation, real GDP growth and 
monetary policy interest rates (in Euro area) This indicator has influenced other studies 
in the Euro-area such as Louzis and Vouldis (2013) particularly because its empirical 
results show that the index possess substantial and robust explanatory power for standard 
macroeconomic variables.  
 
 
 
16 
 
According to Hollo, D., Kremer, M., & Lo Duca, M. (2012) a FSI not only permits the real 
time monitoring and assessment of the stress level in the whole financial system, but it 
may also be used to gauge the impact of policy measures aimed at alleviating financial 
instability.  The lesson from Bhundia and Ricci (2005) is that the South African Reserve 
Bank’s policy response of increasing interest rates in response to pressure on the rand and 
borrowing foreign currency in the futures market and selling it in the spot market during 
the 1998 long term capital management (LTCM) crisis aggravated the crisis along with 
subsequent macroeconomic performance, while a lack of intervention during 2001 led to 
the crisis retreating faster which insinuates that even though there may be similarities in 
the birth of crises, policy behaviour and macroeconomic consequences can differ 
remarkably. South African authorities learnt from the 1998 mistake that an inflation-
targeting framework successfully provided a more credible anchor for managing 
exchange rate fluctuations in South Africa. 
 
Lastly, multivariate data analysis techniques can be used to model factors and responses 
and find the relationship that exists between all factors and responses and can extract 
useful information from multivariate data. There are varied techniques that can be used 
for the purpose of combing components and creating the FSI, however the PCA is 
employed in this study in contrast the SARB’s variance-equal weight technique. 
 
As the literature review reveals, there are varied approaches regarding the optimality of 
constructing a FSI - different methods and procedures are employed in empirical 
research in the selection the variables that should be included to construct FSIs. Yet the 
choice of the variables or raw stress indicators is of crucial importance for the 
construction of financial stress indices as they should represent key features of financial 
stress. It is therefore of critical interest for the current study to identify variables not yet 
considered in a South African context but would optimally capture key aspects of 
financial stress and hence will provide valuable information about the state of the 
economy and to fill the void in the literature. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Methodology 
Procedure of analysis towards uncovering the merits of this study is introduced here. The 
literature review in the preceding chapter offers a variety of methodology to build a FSI, 
a method that would statistically and scientifically isolate the most significant variables 
for building Financial Stress Index in South Africa is proposed. In this regard, literature 
repeatedly pointed at Principal Components Analysis (PCA), due to its tractability and 
wide application in such studies and practice. 
3.1.1 Principal Component Analysis 
PCA will be used to aggregate the relevant variables and then build an FSI for South 
Africa. The PCA method reflects a common factor, which is extracted from a group of 
financial indicators and captures the greatest common variation among them. 
 
 PCA defined as a multivariate technique that analyzes a data table in which observations 
are described by several inter-correlated quantitative dependent variables Abdi and 
Williams (2010). It is a statistical method that accounts for most of the original variability 
using a relatively small number of components by forming linear combinations of 
observed variables until data is reduced to a handful of measures that describe the overall 
population. The method analyses a data table representing observations described by 
several dependent variables, which are, in general, inter-correlated. Its goal is to extract 
the important information from the data table and to express this information as a set of 
new orthogonal variables called principal components. PCA is suitable when dealing with 
a lot of variables because incorporating all of them in a regression model can by 
definition lead to multicollinearity (the correlation amongst independent variables). The 
problem with regression analysis that occurs when two independent variables are highly 
correlated is that the relationship between dependent variable   and independent variable 
  is warped. 
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PCA principally allows a single series variable to be extracted which effectively captures 
the information in the background of all the factors that could otherwise co-move.  It is 
presumed that each of these variables captures financial stress and hence all variables are 
likely to move together according to the level of financial stress in the economy Zhou, 
Xu, and Jiang (2017).  This tendency of co-movement therefore would present a serious 
econometric error if put individually in an econometric model the outcome would be a 
spurious outcome. In the presence of multicollinearity, confidence intervals tend to be 
wide and t-statistics tend to be small even with a high    value. To mitigate this risk, a 
single indicator or representation is more viable to speak of the entire risks presented by 
the variables. The single risk value should be a principal risk component as a proxy of the 
variables that could well explain financial stress.  
 
An effective final model is expected to include variables which should explain more than 
50% of total variance. The threshold is thus set at 50% for the purposes of this study. A 
drawback of PCA is that it does not allow for auto-correlation i.e. factor is constructed as a 
stationary variable with a zero mean thus it lacks a dynamic (autocorrelation) pattern. 
Abdi and Williams (2010) , it is not robust and is sensitive to outliers since it minuses 
squared distances from the multidimensional mean.  
   
Given that episodes of financial stress are rare events, there will be difficulty in 
ascertaining whether an FSI is valuable. Nonetheless, the FSIs obtained using the PCA 
method will be compared to pre-determined benchmarks (the South African Central 
Bank’s FSI and a composite business cycle leading indicator) and assessed from that 
standpoint. The idea is to test whether the SAFSI can capture stress better. The 
relationship between the SAFSI and key economic variables (aggregate price levels, 
aggregate economic activity and interest rates) is examined using the Vector 
Autoregressive model – i.e. looking at FSI and key variables to ascertain how these key 
variables impact FSI and test how these economic variables are affected when there is 
spill over from FSI (when there is stress)  
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3.1.2  Vector Autoregression 
A  Vector Autoregression model (an econometric model used to capture the linear 
interdependencies among multiple time series) will be best to demonstrate the 
relationship among the variables. Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models are natural tools 
for forecasting, they are setup is such that current values of a set of variables are partly 
explained by past values of the variables involved. The same model will be used to 
consider the links between financial tension and economic activity as well as the impact 
of shocks. Since the dynamic interactions between variables and vector autoregressive 
(VAR) models have best been described and interpreted by impulse response functions, 
there will be focus on impulse responses functions in order to assess the extent to which 
shocks in variables affect other variables and for how long (the magnitude and 
persistence of shocks)  
3.1.3 Granger causality test 
To study macro-financial links, Granger-causality test, a statistical hypothesis test for 
determining whether one time series is useful in forecasting another is employed. If a 
variable, or group of variables, c1 is found to be helpful for predicting another variable, 
or group of variables, c2 then c1 is said to Granger-cause c2; otherwise it is said to fail to 
Granger-cause c2. 
 
Specifically, X is said to Granger-cause Y if previous values of X contain information that 
helps predict Y above and beyond that contained in past values of Y alone. The form of 
the Granger-causality equation is specified as 
          
 
           
 
                         (3.1) 
          
 
           
 
      ,                  (3.2) 
 
where   denotes the maximum lag length and    and    are two uncorrelated white noise 
processes. Furthermore, Y is said to cause X when    is not equal to zero. Similarly, X 
causes Y when    is significantly different from zero; that is, if the p-value is less than 5%. 
When both statements hold, there is a feedback relationship between the two time series. 
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3.1.3 Financial stress measure 
A financial stress index (FSI) measures the current state of stress in the financial system 
by combining several indicators of stress into a single statistic Park and Mercado (2014), a 
measure of performance of the stress indices is how well they measure and detect 
previous episodes of turmoil. An indicator is expected to rise considerably in stress 
periods in response to an occurrence that is known to have triggered a dysfunction in the 
stability of the financial system. Therefore, it is required that what counts as a 
‘considerable rise’ is measurable. For the purposes of the study this is interpreted as 
follows: FSI > 1 financial stress and FSI < 1 no financial stress. 
3.1.4 Selection of episodes of financial stress 
Researchers follow different definitions when it comes to capturing a stress event, (Illing 
& Liu, 2006) defined financial stress as the force exerted on economic agents by 
uncertainty and changing expectations of losses in financial markets and institutions. 
Hakkio and Keeton (2009) describe financial stress as an interruption to the normal 
functioning of financial markets; they argue that episodes of financial stress must involve 
at least one of the following: (i) increased uncertainty about fundamental value of assets, 
(ii) increased asymmetry of information, (iii) decreased willingness to hold risky assets, 
and (iv) decreased willingness to hold illiquid assets. 
 
Statistically type I errors (failure to report a high-stress event) can be reduced by not 
limiting stress identification of events to quantitative measures as these are likely to miss 
events that, for instance, are a result of a slow build-up of bad news rather than linked to 
a certain episode. (Hollo et al., 2012) Therefore for the study, episodes of financial 
turmoil will include known events: the East Asian crisis (1998), the ‘dot.com’ crisis (2000), 
the 9/11 events/rand (ZAR) crisis (2001) and global financial crisis (2008/2009). This list of 
events is drawn from South Africa’s Industrial Development Corporation (IDC)’s 
department of research and information report published in December 2013. The report 
examines the South African post-apartheid economic landscape between 1994 and 2013. 
Established in 1940, the IDC is a national development finance institution set up to 
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promote economic growth and industrial development. They are owned by the South 
African government under the supervision of the Economic Development Department. 
The bank of crisis events is selected from this report as the event’s inclusion was based on 
them being explicitly identified as having had a significant impact on South African 
markets. 
 
3.2 Construction of a financial stress index – theoretical analysis 
There are few studies in literature that resemble an overall FSI for emerging market 
countries. Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kenc (2013)  produce an FSI for Turkey focusing on the 
1997-2010 period; the authors consider variables that have empirically been proven to 
capture key aspects of financial stress in emerging market economies. They incorporate: 
banking sector fragility, time varying stock market return volatility, an exchange market 
pressure index, external debt, sovereign debt spreads, trade credit and credit stress. The 
same variables are used to gauge financial stress in the South African economy. In 
addition, a variable that is a proxy for liquidity in financial markets is added as liquidity 
measures market risk and liquidity with implications for monetary policy, financial 
stability and economic activity, thus a total of eight variables are considered for design 
the SAFSI. The selection of proxies for each variable relied on their relevance and 
availability of data, the discussion from here onwards relates to the justification of 
selection of proxies. 
 
3.2.1 Banking sector fragility 
The South African economy is dominated by the banking sector which accounts for 
approximately 22% of GDP growth steadily increasing from 17% in 1994, therefore the 
stability of the banking sector is of paramount importance to include in the SAFSI. 
Anything that worsens a bank’s balance sheet could qualify as a measure of the sector’s 
fragility; nonetheless in this context the study makes use of the TED spread which is the 
spread between the 3-month interbank lending rate and the 91-day Treasury Bill rate for 
South Africa - the wider the spread, the riskier the banking sector is. The spread reflects 
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the risk associated with lending to banks versus lending to the South African 
government. Therefore, an increase in the spread is indicative of counterparty risk (risk of 
default of interbank loans) increasing and consequently a weakening of the banking 
sector. Banking sector index takes into account the variability of banking sector returns in 
relation to the whole market and thus an alternative proxy for banking sector volatility 
will be obtained using the GARCH (1, 1) model. A decomposition of the GARCH model 
is detailed in the empirical analysis section. 
3.2.2 Securities market risk 
Securities markets become more volatile in periods of high financial stress and the 
volatility of securities market is essential in pricing derivatives and hedging evidence. 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange all-share index (FTSE/JSE Africa Bank Index), which 
is a representation of market capitalisation weighted index  is used to extract time 
varying  stock market volatility  using the GARCH (1, 1) model and employed to 
measure stock market securities risk, higher volatility captures heightened uncertainty. 
 
3.2.3 Currency risk 
The exchange rate relative to the most traded currency in the world (US $) is an 
indication of a country’s economic performance. An appreciating local currency shows an 
investor’s willingness to invest in a country; on the other hand, an exchange rate that 
excessively appreciates could be an indication of currency overvaluation. 
 
Currency risk will be derived by applying the GARCH (1, 1) model on monthly change of 
real effective exchange rate which reflects investor’s uncertainty about the fundamental 
value of the currency. REER (real effective exchange rate) is defined as “the weighted 
average of a country's currency relative to an index or basket of other major currencies, 
adjusted for the effects of inflation.” A decrease in REER indicates a depreciation of local 
currency against the weighted basket of currencies of its trading partners. A REER 
coefficient which is less than 1 means that the home currency is worth less than the 
imported currency and vice versa. Alternatively, a monthly index of the EMPI (Exchange 
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Market Pressure Index) as proposed by Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kenc (2013) which 
incorporates exchange rate change, international reserves change and the overnight local 
interest rate change relative to the US interest rate will be used to measure currency risk 
as follows:           
                                    
        
   
  
            
     
  
          
            
                                                                                  (3.3) 
 
where     and       are 12-month changes in the exchange rate and total reserves 
minus gold and    plus   represent mean and deviation of the exchange rate and total 
international reserves respectively and    and      represent the overnight interest rate 
for South Africa and the US, respectively. Similarly    denotes the standard deviation of 
variable x (x = the changes in the exchange rate, total reserves, and overnight interest 
rate).  
3.2.4 External debt 
Although debt is pertinent to sustainable growth in emerging markets, unsustainable 
debt levels lead to liquidity and solvency issues. Extreme increases in debt lead not only 
to questions around its sustainability but also tend to yield negative growth results for 
African countries as per Muhanji and Ojah (2011). There is a strong linkage between 
sustainable debt levels and the ability of open African economies to survive external 
shocks as the authors found, ineffective management of external shocks are part of the 
reason that Africa’s external debt problems have persisted. A debt crisis arises from the 
inability of a nation to service its foreign debt obligation therefore the 12-month growth 
rate of total external debt is used as part of SAFSI.   
3.2.5 Sovereign risk 
A decline of investor sentiment of South African economy tends to reflect recessionary 
conditions as it underpins capital flows into the country, interest rate spreads between 
South Africa and the US are used as gages for sovereign risk which is computed by taking 
the difference between South Africa’s current government 10-year index and US Treasury 
10-year yield. The sovereign spread indicates risk of the government’s funding ability in 
the capital markets; a rising spread is a sign of increased default risk. 
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3.2.6 Trade finance   
In a small, open economy like South Africa the balance of payments reflects the 
disequilibrium in the economy; if domestic savings are not enough to cover domestic 
investment or if there is a trade deficit then the country needs either a high level of 
reserves or net capital inflows to bridge the gap. Although South Africa has profited from 
increasing global investor interest in global markets it is characterised by a structural 
trade deficit because of its tendency to import high value and export low value. This 
makes the country more vulnerable to adverse effects of mismanagement of trade 
financing, effects such as increased foreign ownership of domestic assets. 
 
Trade finance is another important component of financial stress for emerging markets, 
without adequate trade finance, opportunities for growth and development are missed yet 
a country that relies less on external funding is less vulnerable to external factors and 
makes it more resilient. Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kenc (2013) use financial account balance, 
a component of the balance of payments (BoP) that covers claims on or liabilities to non-
residents as a proxy for trade finance. Equally, the South Africa BoP financial account 
balance is a proxy of trade finance.  
3.2.7 Credit stress 
Credit provision to the private sector is one of the ways that South Africa has liberalised 
its financial system in order to develop it, though there is merit to this strategy credit 
stress has a negative impact and is of prime importance in a developing economy such as 
South Africa, the growth rate of the claims on the private sector as a percentage of broad 
money to represent credit stress is utilised. 
3.2.8 Liquidity 
Financial markets in developing nations such as South Africa have evolved since the 
1980s by progressing in ways such as establishing and deepening stock exchanges, 
privatisation of owned entities and opening up bank ownership to foreigners; creating 
financial markets that should enable sustainable economic growth. Andrianaivo and 
Yartey (2009) Liquidity facilitates price discovery and is a key indicator of financial 
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market development. Because of a lack of data for the bid-ask spread for the period of 
observation, stock market capitalisation scaled by GDP is used as a proxy for liquidity. 
 
3.3 Data and preliminary observations 
The preceding discussion uses an array of macroeconomic variables which are described 
in section 3.2 titled construction of a financial stress index. The study focuses on the post-
apartheid era of 1995 to 2016; the range of data is based on availability baring in mind 
the more crises events that the index can be tested against, the better the assessment of its 
performance. The study uses data obtained from Bloomberg, Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Federal Reserve Economic 
Data (FRED) database, on a frequency of data that is monthly, see Appendix A for a 
record summary of data collected. 
 
3.3.1 Banking sector fragility 
The raw banking sector index data in figure 3.1 represents South Africa’s banking sector 
index - FTSE/JSE Africa Bank Index for South Africa - as obtained from Bloomberg for 
January 1997 – June 2016. It is observed that the index is at its lowest until 2005 
thereafter there is steady escalation of the index with peaks in 2007-2008 and again in 
2014-2015. Banking sector index was at its most volatile in 1998. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that banking sector returns exhibits volatility clustering, which is 
confirmed by the statistical significance ARCH-LM test as reported in Table 4.1 presented 
on page 36. One of the underlying assumptions of the error term    of the classic linear 
regression model               is that the variance of all error terms is constant and 
finite over all values of     i.e.             
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      Figure 3.1 Banking sector index (DLBSPRICE) 
 
 
The TED spread (T_Spread) as per figure 3.2 below, is computed by taking the difference 
between the 3-month interbank lending rate and the 91-day TB rate - the wider the 
spread, the more fragile the banking sector. The expectation is that banking sector 
fragility will have a negative coefficient that is statistically significant for both the 
GARCH model and the TED spread. In terms of the spread, the period where it is widest 
is 1998 followed by 1996 then 2008/2009 and to a milder extent 2002, this signifies that 
investors preferred to invest in the safer 91-day TB during these periods. This exhibition 
of flight to quality and liquidity is considered a hint of a presence of financial stress. 
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       Figure 3.2 TED Spread 
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3.3.2 Security market risk 
Once again results of the ARCH-LM test tabled in table 4.1 confirm that there are ARCH 
effects present in the securities market data set therefore there is a need to apply GARCH 
models in order to treat the problem of heteroskedasticity. Time varying volatility stock 
market volatility was obtained using the GARCH (1, 1) model, using FTSE/JSE All Share 
Index data was gleaned from Bloomberg. The raw series shows stagnation up until 2005 
and then steady growth up until 2016. The most significant peak was in the 2006- 2008 
period while volatility is most prevalent in 1998; 2001/2002 and 2008. 
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       Figure 3.3 Securities market index (DLJALSH)  
 
3.3.3 Currency risk  
Figure 3.4 signals that local currency was under strain in 1998, 2001, 2008 and 2015, a 
sharp increase in the USD/ZAR rate can be observed in these periods (i.e. depreciation of 
ZAR) while periods of 2003-2006 and 2009-2010 give an idea about a better performing 
ZAR relative to the US dollar. The ZAR depreciated in nominal terms against the US 
dollar (USD) by 28 % (April 1998 – August 1998); 26 %( September 2001- December 2001 
(Bhundia & Ricci, 2005) 39 % (July 2008 – January 2009) and 25% (January 2015 – 
December 2015). Notably, a REER a depreciation of the ZAR is depicted by a trough and 
an appreciation by a peak in figure 3.5. The loss in currency value on a real effective basis 
during these periods signifies that carrying the rand was riskier over the same periods as 
the depreciation in nominal terms (1998, 2001, 2008 and 2015).  
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Figure 3.4 ZAR/USD exchange 
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           Figure 3.5 Real effective exchange rates (REER) for 1995 -2016 
 
 
      
GARCH (1,1) was once again be used to model the variance depicted in figure 3.5 above,  
from the raw data it is clear that exchange rates had the most variability in 1998, 2002 
and 2008. Results are recorded in table 4.1 page 36. 
 
The overall market pressures (intensity and duration) will be evaluated using the EMPI 
which takes into account movements in the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves 
(Cevik, Dibooglu, & Kenc, 2013) EMPI is computed as follows: 
 
                                                
        
   
  
            
     
  
          
            
                                  (3.4) 
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EMPI increases as the exchange rate depreciates or as international reserves decline, in 
figure 3.6 depicts added currency pressure in 1998, 2001 and 2008.  
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Figure 3.6 Exchange market pressure index (EMPI) 
 
3.3.4 External debt 
The country’s outstanding foreign debt that is distinguishable between short and longer 
term is only available from 2002.  Due to this, the South Africa debt to GDP ratio 
obtained from Bloomberg (SABTGDIQ Index) is extracted for the period of isolation and 
then transformed by multiplying it with GDP. Because both debt to GDP ratios and GDP 
levels are reported in quarterly frequency, data is subsequently transformed from low to 
high frequency using the quadratic match average method which performs a proprietary 
local quadratic interpolation of the low frequency data to fill in the high observations. 
The graphic illustration of the transformed data reveals troughs in 2002, 2006 and 2007 
followed by an upward trajectory that saw levels being reinstated to around 50% by the 
end of 2016.           
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                 Figure 3.7 South African Debt (DLOGDEBT) 
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3.3.5 Sovereign risk 
South Africa’s current government 10-year index (CTZAR10YR) is available from 1998 
while the US Treasury 10-year yield (USGG10YR) is obtained from 1995. A dynamic back 
casting in the software programme eViews, is used to estimate the missing South Africa’s 
current government 10-year index data before the original observation range. That is, a 
random walk model for the 1998 – 2016 series is built and then back casted for the 
missing values 1995 – 1998 using the exponential smoothing technique. 
 
Sovereign spread (S_SPREAD1) is taken as the difference between USGG10YR and the 
logged difference of CTZAR10YR – LDCTZAR10YR, because the US Treasury yield is 
taken to be the risk free rate it is subtracted from South Africa’s current government 10 
year index. The spread should widen when there is strain on the South African financial 
system as this would signify flight to quality and liquidity. 
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Figure 3.8.  S_Spread  
 
 
Since 2014 South Africa’s ratings downgraded by most rating agencies has been looming. 
Poor growth prospects and rising government debt as well as high deficits on the current 
account are cited as reasons for the possible downgrade. The spread is widest during 
1998/1999 and 2003.  
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3.3.6 Trade finance 
Balance of payments series (SABPFABL from Bloomberg) is reported on a quarterly basis 
as a result, the data is converted to a monthly frequency using the quadratic match 
average method. South Africa has a long record of trade deficits which is characterised by 
a high appetite for imports. Quarter three 2016 data is missing for this index and so, the 
average of quarter two 2016 and four 2016 was used and that figure as quarter three’s 
value. Data was then de-trended to take seasonality out resulting in variable DLBOP. In 
recent times, weak global demand impacted exports and the weaker currency has offset 
to some extent the highly adverse trends in commodity prices.  
-60,000
-40,000
-20,000
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
DBOP
 
Figure 3.9 BOP Balance of payments (DDLBOP) 
3.3.7 Credit stress 
IMF’s South Africa claims on private sector annual growth as a percentage of broad 
money is depicted in figure 3.10 below. Claims on private sector include gross credit from 
the financial system to individuals, enterprises, nonfinancial public entities not included 
under net domestic credit, and financial institutions not included elsewhere. There is a 
monumentally razor-sharp dip in the proxy in 2001 followed by a strong recovery a few 
months later, the most notable variation since then is the reduction in rate from 2007 to 
2008 likely caused by the banking sector cutting back on lending to the private sector as 
they were seeking to reduce risk by deleveraging. The rate of expansion has been 
uneventful ever since; weak credit growth goes in hand with the subdued outlook for SA 
consumption, thus, there is an expectation that the coefficient for credit stress to be 
insignificant and positive in sign. 
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Figure 3.10 Claims on private sector (DLOGPSG) 
3.3.8 Liquidity 
An index volume represents the trading activity in of all securities that are covered by a 
particular index; therefore the volume and price from the JALSH index is used to 
compute market capitalisation then it is scaled by GDP. Again, the constant match sum 
method was used to transform GDP data from low to high frequency. Figure 3.11 shows a 
significant upside in stock market activity per GDP during 1998 followed by periods of 
heightened activity in 2001/2002. It’s clear from the pattern in figure 3.11 that each time 
the market turns after a trough, there are gains within a short period of time which 
signals to the market being relatively efficient.  
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Figure 3.11 Market capitalisation scaled by GDP (DLMGDP) 
 
 
Because of the assumed relation between stock market liquidity and economic growth, 
the coefficient for this proxy should be positive; as in the more developed and liquid the 
JSE is, the less financial stress there is. 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.4 shows summary descriptive statistics of all the proxies for the pre-determined 
variables. EMPI shows the highest mean while the standard deviation is highest for REER; 
both are representatives of currency risk.  The mean and median of REER are 
comparatively not close to each other, this indicates that the midpoint of data is not close 
to the mean therefore currency risk is loosely clustered against the mean. The proxies 
generally do follow the standard risk-return trade-off where high standard deviation is 
expected to be accompanied by high returns with the exception of DLBOP the proxy for 
trade finance; its standard deviation is very high relative to its mean which means that 
the proxy possesses a lot of risk. The Jarque-Bera statistic strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis of normality in all the return distributions. The skewness and kurtosis confirm 
that distributions are not normal as the kurtosis is greater than 3 for all variables 
meaning that all distribution is leptokurtic plus a normal distribution has a skewness of 0, 
a value that none of the variables have. 
 
 
Table 3.4 Summary descriptive statistics of log returns 
  DLBSPRICE T_SPREAD DLJALSH REER EMPI DLOGDEBT DLBOP S_SPREAD1 DLOGPSC DLMGDP 
 Mean 0.010 0.001 0.009 -0.196 0.062 0.008 0.009 -0.018 0.011 0.013 
 Median 0.010 0.010 0.011 -0.095 0.080 0.010 0.003 -0.021 0.005 0.018 
 Maximum 0.292 1.240 0.132 7.280 5.140 0.060 18.542 0.889 0.584 1.242 
 Minimum -0.485 -1.380 -0.351 -11.850 -2.820 -0.057 -18.677 -1.081 -0.158 -0.527 
 Std. Dev. 0.074 0.266 0.056 2.887 1.315 0.017 5.093 0.271 0.042 0.210 
 Skewness -0.942 0.069 -1.222 -0.804 0.467 -0.479 0.188 -0.023 10.121 0.627 
 Kurtosis 10.999 10.602 9.564 5.049 3.821 4.642 9.878 3.972 140.700 7.089 
           
 Jarque-Bera 692.273 592.597 502.855 69.559 15.869 37.200 488.305 9.700 198554.100 187.510 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 
           
 Sum 2.469 0.130 2.321 -48.280 15.240 2.006 2.133 -4.395 2.633 3.155 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 
1.330 17.383 0.755 2041.400 423.676 0.069 6381.189 17.949 0.438 10.809 
           
 
Observations 
234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics for the log returns of the proxies at monthly frequency from January 1997 to June 2016 
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Appendix B shows the pairwise correlation coefficients. There is mostly low correlation 
meaning that the variables capture different dimensions of financial stress. .The 
correlation ranges from -0.154 to 0.66, which indicates weak co-movement of the 
variables. The low correlations also suggest that each variable can be treated as free 
explanatory variable. The highest correlation (and the most statistically significant as 
denoted by a t-statistic of greater than 5)  is between the JSE All Share (DLJALSH) and 
the banking sector index (DLBSPRICE) likely because the South African banking sector 
dominates the stock exchange. The two variables with the least correlation are external 
debt (DLOGDEBT) and trade finance (DLBOP) this could mean that internal debt is a 
bigger source of trade finance rather than external debt.  
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4. EMPERICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Results interpretation of stationarity test 
A stationary series is defined as one with a constant mean, constant variance and constant 
autocovariances for each given lag (weak stationarity) A series that is not stationary has 
the following consequences: shocks do not decay; a spurious regression and statistical 
inference will be wrong (t-stats and standard errors will be wrong, distributions assumed 
will be invalid) Two tests are undertaken to confirm that returns are stationary (since the 
dlog of stock prices is used) the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips 
Perron (PP) test. ADF’s objective is to examine the null hypothesis that              
             against the one-sided alternative        thus H0: series contains a unit 
root versus H1: series is stationary.  
 
The test results recorded in Table 4.1 indicate that all the transformed series have a unit 
root process at levels and are integrated of the order I(1).  PP is non-parametric and builds 
on the ADF test with its robustness with respect to unspecified autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity in the disturbance process of the test equation. 
 
4.2 Generalised AutoRegressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity(GARCH) 
One of the underlying assumptions of classic linear regression model is that the variance 
of the error terms is constant and finite over all values of     
 
                                    (4.1) 
 
an assumption that denotes homeskedasticity, however when the assumption is violated 
and error terms are not constant and finite over all values of      the time series suffers 
from heteroskedasticity, that is, there is volatility clustering. According to Engle (2001), 
volatility clustering is a phenomenon where good or bad information filters into the 
market in clusters, then an econometric model using classic linear regression becomes 
hard to interpret.   
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The GARCH model for variance is designed to model volatility clustering, it is specified 
as follows: 
  
                                             
   
                   
            (4.3) 
                     
 
4.3 Results interpretation of ARCH-LM test 
With regards to the series that exhibited volatility clustering and needed to be modelled 
using GARCH, the null hypothesis that there is no ARCH up to order in the residuals is 
tested by running the regression: 
 
                                                         
            
                                          (4.4) 
 
ARCH-LM test of order of 10 strongly rejects the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity in 
the individual series which makes it valid to employ GARCH models for the conditional 
variance of the returns for DLBSPRICE, REER and DLJALSH. p-values are less than 0.5 
(significant) at 10 lags for each series which confirms justification for implying the 
GARCH (1,1) model. Please refer to Appendix E for autocorrelation functions 
(ACF)/correlograms. 
 
Following the employment of the GARCH (1, 1) model, the standardised variables 
examination for autocorrelation,  ARCH-LM results confirm the absence of ARCH-effects 
in the individual series because p-values are now greater than 0.5 meaning it can be 
accepted that the hypothesis of “no residual ARCH” is true.  The variance equation is also 
recorded in table 4.1 where it is clear that the AR and MA terms are statistically 
significant for DLBSPRICE and DLJALSH however the AR (1) term is not statistically 
significant for REER. Parameter estimates from GARCH (1, 1) models for the conditional 
variance are reported in the second panel of the table. They indicate that the GARCH 
model captures the high volatility persistence in the variables and is correctly specified. 
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The sum of the ARCH and GARCH coefficients,     , indicates that shocks to volatility 
have a persistent effect on the conditional variance.  
 
In other words, periods of high volatility in the prices will last for a long time (Engle, 
2001). 
Table 4.1 Estimation Results of ARMA (p,q)-GARCH(p,q) 
Models 
  DLBSPRICE DLJALSH REER 
PANEL A: MEAN MODEL       
C 1.329 0.0117 -0.2158 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.2974] 
AR (1) 0.8505 -0.62909 -0.29046 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.0089] 
AR(2)  -0.801  
    [0.000]   
MA(1) -0.8909 0.5682 0.5872 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.0001] 
MA(2)  0.8329  
    [0.000]   
Notes: p values are recorded in parentheses   
PANEL B: GARCH MODEL       
 DLBSPRICE DLJALSH REER 
        
Constant 3.3719 0.0001 1.0407 
  [0.132] [0.21] [0.0350] 
ARCH 0.207 0.285 0.1333 
  [0.006] [0.0002] [0.0471] 
GARCH 0.7478 0.7073 0.7356 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Notes: p values are recorded in parentheses  
4.3.1 Banking sector fragility result 
The results of the ARCH-LM test recorded in table 4.1 above show that there are ARCH 
effects present in this data set (high volatility is followed by high volatility and low 
volatility is followed by low volatility) therefore there is a need to apply GARCH models 
in order to treat the problem of heteroskedasticity. 
 
4.4  Lag order selection 
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) are 
used to select optimal lag lengths for all the variables, the result show that the smallest 
AIC and BIC values correspond to an ARMA (2,2) model for DLJALSH and an AMRA 
(1,1) model for DLSPRICE and REER. To test for autocorrelation, the Ljung box test is 
applied to the residuals after formulating appropriate ARMA (p,q) model for each of the 
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variables. The Box-Ljung test null hypothesis HO is: model does not exhibit a lack of fit 
while the alternate hypothesis H1 is: the model exhibits lack of fit. As per table 3.6, the p-
values are significant at 36 lags for all the variables; thus the null hypothesis is rejected 
and table 4.2 beneath depicts the results. 
 
Table 4.2 ADF and PP results 
  PP ADF p 
DLBSPRICE I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
T_SPREAD I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
DLJALSH I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
REER I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
EMPI I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
DLOGDEBT I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
DLBOP I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
S_SPREAD1 I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
DLOGPSC I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
DLMGDP I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 0.000 
Notes:  ˟ indicates statistical significance at 5%  and 
10%.   
    
 
  
4.5 Aggregation of components 
The proxies above still possess a variety of distributions, this makes developing an 
aggregation scheme that preserves the interpretation of each indicator difficult. 
Therefore, it is useful to transform every indicator to ensure compatibility before 
aggregation, subject to several considerations. PCA accounts for most of the original 
variability using a relatively small number of components. By forming linear 
combinations of observed variables, data reduction is achieved by creating a handful of 
measures that describe the overall population. The new linear combination can is 
expressed as: 
 
   p1 = β11x1 + β12x2 +· · ·+β1k xk                                       (4.5) 
 p2 = β21x1 + β22x2 +· · ·+β2k xk           (4.6) 
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where βij are coefficients to be calculated, representing the coefficient on the j the 
explanatory variable in the i th principal component. These coefficients are also known as 
factor loadings. Points with the largest variation will have the most influence on principal 
components as components are ranked in terms of the amount of variance that they 
explain for this reason, data is normalised before it is aggregated into the components in 
order to reduce the risk of having variables with the biggest variance overwhelm the 
PCA. There is no consensus on how to best scale the data for PCA, in this regard the study 
uses a normalising procedure from the eViews software that converts proxies to mean-
reverting with minimum variance. 
 
Aggregation of an index should reflect the relative importance of the various variables 
hence the PCA methodology is selected, it is a statistical procedure that uses an 
orthogonal transformation to convert a set of observations of possibly correlated variables 
into a set of values of linearly uncorrelated variables called principal components. 
 
When looking to tell a story using several independent variables, PCA assists with 
deducing which linear combination of these variables matters the most. It constructs a 
new property by summarising data and keeping the best possible characteristics of the 
data. It creates a new property that is linearly combined and reflects both common and 
unique variance (Abdi & Williams, 2010). 
 
4.6 Results and Findings 
A principal component analysis was performed for the purpose of this study to identify 
key drivers of financial stress. The study used E-views statistical software package to enter 
and compute the measurements of the model. 
 
The initial grouping included all 10 proxies and the first four components 
(representatives of trade finance, liquidity, external debt, credit stress and currency risk 
respectively) account for 53% of all variability. The first step is to remove T_Spread and 
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EMPI variables from the grouping since the correlation coefficients of the alternate 
proxies for banking sector fragility and security markets risk DLBSPRICE and REER 
respectively are higher. What remains is banking sector volatility obtained from a 
GARCH (1, 1) model as a proxy for the banking sector and the REER as a proxy for 
securities market risk.  
 
Table 4.3 Principal Component Analysis results 
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 8, Average = 1)      
    Cumulative Cumulative   
Number Value    Difference Proportion Value Proportion    
         
1 1.60575 0.241585 0.2007 1.60575 0.2007    
2 1.364166 0.229109 0.1705 2.969916 0.3712    
3 1.135057 0.132587 0.1419 4.104973 0.5131    
4 1.00247 0.050441 0.1253 5.107442 0.6384    
5 0.952029 0.134909 0.119 6.059471 0.7574    
6 0.81712 0.197798 0.1021 6.876592 0.8596    
7 0.619322 0.115235 0.0774 7.495913 0.937    
8 0.504087 ---     0.063 8 1    
         
Eigenvectors (loadings):        
         
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   PC 5   PC 6   PC 7   PC 8   
         
DLBSPRICE 0.411619 0.499951 0.042733 -0.044058 0.25835 0.171243 -0.678716 0.141868 
DLJALSH -0.453772 0.515638 0.186407 -0.146368 0.12097 0.056374 0.045583 -0.67242 
DLBOP 0.016489 0.104548 0.069156 0.972042 0.161765 -0.005604 0.069611 -0.090022 
DLMGDP 0.319592 0.425085 -0.483613 -0.092083 0.239536 0.130441 0.625947 0.09274 
DLOGDEBT 0.021579 -0.307247 0.480234 -0.121304 0.69122 0.369921 0.197648 0.078126 
DLOGPSC 0.256583 0.190718 0.485186 0.030512 -0.595207 0.499343 0.234885 0.051667 
REER -0.574301 0.36653 0.151325 0.016747 0.019378 -0.074613 0.066822 0.708693 
S_SPREAD1 0.355145 0.165591 0.485627 -0.085812 0.051423 -0.747462 0.204719 0.001085 
 
 
With this change, eight proxies for the eight variables that are crucial measures for 
emerging markets stress remain. 63% of variation is accounted for by the first four 
variables. Table 4.3 shows results of a PCA computed on a correlation matrix. The first 
section provides a summary of the eigenvalues and the second section shows the 
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corresponding eigenvectors. The principal component explains 20% of the variation; the 
second principal component explains an additional 17% of the overall variation. The 
proportion that the remainder of the variables add individually is close to 10% each, in 
fact each component following the first two principal components adds between 7% and 
13% additional variation, this signifies that each variable makes a decent contribution 
towards explaining the overall variance in the data. 
 
PCA reports eigenvalues and eigenvectors, eigenvalues explain the scale of the principal 
components while eigenvectors explain the direction of the principal components. When 
eigenvector is multiplied by the square root of the eigenvalue the result is a factor 
loading: 
 
                                                                                                 (4.7) 
 
 
Factor loadings help to interpret principal components because they provide information 
about the load and direction of a principal value within the stress index. In other words, 
from the above principal component analysis, it is clear that principal component one 
accounts for 20% of total variance of the FSI and has positive loadings for all components 
except DLJALSH and REER. The first four principal components have eigenvalues of 
more than 1. The contribution of variable   to component Ꮥ is derived as follows: 
 
                                           Ꮥ   
  
 
  Ꮥ
   
 
  Ꮥ
 
 
  
  
 
  Ꮥ
  
                                                                       (4.8) 
 
Where    is the eigenvalue of the  th factor. Eigenvalues that are greater than 1 is one 
way of identifying the number of components to retain for a PCA based on a correlation 
matrix, the scree plot is a graphical way of making the same decision.  
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             Figure 4.1  Scree Plot 
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Correlations across sub-indices recorded in table 4.4 below are weak which means the 
state of financial instability will not be so widespread in the event of a stress episode.  
 
Table 4.4 Ordinary correlations of principal components 
Ordinary correlations:        
          
 DLBSPRICE DLJALSH DLBOP DLMGDP DLOGDEBT DLOGPSC REER S_SPREAD1 
DLBSPRICE 1        
DLJALSH 0.037649 1       
DLBOP 0.045929 -0.015619 1      
DLMGDP 0.302448 -0.002839 0.000466 1     
DLOGDEBT -0.022355 -0.036694 -0.014023 -0.14218 1    
DLOGPSC 0.150288 -0.011052 0.015642 -0.015919 -0.020245 1   
REER -0.10609 0.466309 0.039313 -0.111288 -0.066788 -0.070653 1  
S_SPREAD1 0.1971 -0.050051 0.00764 0.031097 0.051054 0.149908 -0.107361 1 
 
 
Figure 4.2 plots orthonormal loadings biplot where eigenvector coefficients and loadings 
between principal components can be observed. The analysis is of components with 
eigenvalues of more than 1 and component scores are displayed as circles and factor 
loadings are displayed as lines. The further each coefficient is from zero, the greater the 
contribution that variable makes to that component. 
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The first graph of figure 4.2 plots principal 1 on the x axis and principal component 2 on 
the y axis. DLJALSH and REER have negative coefficients which means they reduce they 
reduce the SAFSI. Although DLOGDEBT and DLBOP have negative coefficients, it is not 
significantly so. The variables that contribute positively to financial stress are 
DLBSPRICE, S_SPREAD, DLMGDP and DLOGPSC in order of their loadings. That is, 
security market and currency risk do not pose as much as of a threat as banking sector 
fragility, illiquidity, sovereign risk and trade finance respectively. The second graph plots 
principal 1 on the x axis and principal component 3 on the y axis. DLJALSH and REER 
still have negative coefficients and DLSBSPRICE still dominates followed closely by 
DLMGDP and S_SPREAD.  
 
Judging by the Orthonormal loadings biplot figure, it is clear that of all the variables with 
a positive coefficient, DLBSPRICE has the highest factor loading followed by S_SPREAD 
and DLMGPD. REER and DLJALSH have negative coefficients and high factor loadings. 
In other words, banking sector fragility, illiquidity, sovereign risk, security market risk 
and exchange risk are the biggest drivers of financial stress from pre-selected variables.  
 
As stated in the preliminary assessment, banking sector fragility would likely dominate 
because of its huge contribution to South African GPD. It cost the South African Reserve 
Bank approximately 9 billion to bailout the country’s fifth bank in market size, African 
Bank Limited, arguably to maintain financial stability. Variability in the banking sector 
causes an immense strain on South Africa’s financial system. What is not expected to 
dominate is the illiquidity proxy, mainly because it is not one of the original variables 
suggested by Cevik, Dibooglu, and Kenc (2013) to capture stress in emerging markets.  
 
Sovereign spread measured by macroeconomic fundamentals, such as interest rate 
spreads between a home country and the United States can be used as a measure of risk 
perception In the short run, it is the degree of political risk, corruption, and financial 
stability in a country that plays the key role in the valuation of sovereign debt. Bellas, 
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Papaioannou, and Petrova (2010), that is to say investor’s risk perceptions drive short term 
capital flows. For South Africa, the risk of the country being downgraded to a junk status 
means the cost of borrowing will swell and make the country an unattractive investment 
prospect. 
 
In summary, an increase in the SAFSI is signal of a severe economic downturn. As 
sovereign spreads widen, exchange markets come under pressure (and thus a slowdown 
in capital flows), lending in banks falter as they attempt to deleverage and ineffective 
financial markets deter investors consequently, financial stability of the country is 
compromised by these conditions. 
 
In some literature, it is common to select at least five principal components before 
constructing an index.  It is important to examine components (variables) and make sure 
that those that are retained provide an interpretable result. To this unrotated factor 
loadings are employed to test whether the same variables dominate as under PCA as per 
figure 4.2. Right off the bat, it is clear that just as PCA selects four principal components, 
there are four retained factors (F1- F4) according to factor loadings and the variance that 
they account for by is approximately 63% (5.107/8) of total variance. In other words, four 
variables have greater explanatory power of overall variability in the index than others. 
 
Factor loadings represent variation between components and the original variable, table 
4.5 shows that DLBSPRICE, DLJALSH, DLMGDP, DLOGDEBT and REER load on the 
second factor (F2) while S_SPREAD loads on F3 and the rest load on F2. Factor 1 (F1) has 
the most correlation with variables with a cumulative loading of 31% followed by Factor 
2 (F2) with 27% , Factor 3 (F3) at 22% and Factor 4 (F4) at 19%.  
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Figure 4.2 Orthonormal Loadings Biplot 
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Table 4.5 Unrotated loadings 
 Unrotated Loadings         
  F1 F2 F3 F4 Communality Uniqueness 
DLBSPRICE 0.521596       0.58393 0.045527 -0.044112 0.617056 0.382944 
DLJALSH -0.575012 0.602252 0.198596 -0.146549 0.754263 0.245737 
DLBOP 0.020895 0.122109 0.073678 0.973242 0.967975 0.032025 
DLMGDP 0.404981 0.496489 -0.515236 -0.092197 0.68448 0.31552 
DLOGDEBT 0.027344 -0.358857 0.511636 -0.121454 0.406049 0.593951 
DLOGPSC 0.325137 0.222754 0.516913 0.03055 0.423466 0.576534 
REER -0.727744 0.428098 0.16122 0.016767 0.739153 0.260847 
S_SPREAD1 0.450033 0.193406 0.517382 -0.085918 0.515001 0.484999 
       
Factor Variance Cumulative Difference Proportion Cumulative 
F1 1.60575 1.60575 0.241585 0.314394 0.314394  
F2 1.364166 2.969916 0.229109 0.267094 0.581488   
F3 1.135057 4.104973 0.132587 0.222236 0.803724  
F4 1.00247 5.107442 --- 0.196276 1   
Total 5.107442 5.107442  1   
       
 
Next, the factors are rotated using a varimax method to minimise the number of 
variables that have high loadings on each factor, a method developed by (Kaiser, 1958) 
For varimax a simple solution means that each component has a smallnumber of large 
loadings and a large number of zero (or small) loadings. (Abdi & Williams, 2010) This 
implies simple interpretation (presented in table 4.5 below) is because, after a varimax 
rotation, each original variable tends to be associated with one (or a small number) of 
components, and each component represents only a small number of variables. As a 
general rule, rotated loadings of above 0.7 are considered important. Thus DLBOP, 
DLJALSH, REER, DLMGDP and S_SPREAD are considered the important to the SAFSI. 
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Table 4.6 Rotated factor loadings 
         
Rotated loadings: L * inv(T)'   
 F1 F2 F3 F4 
DLBSPRICE -0.006644  0.552688  0.558139  0.005345 
DLJALSH  0.860574  0.071254  0.060855 -0.069957 
DLBOP -0.002389  0.022947  0.044207  0.982593 
DLMGDP -0.104377  0.814757  0.055894 -0.081438 
DLOGDEBT -0.112519 -0.559264  0.255103 -0.124638 
DLOGPSC  0.019046 -0.066998  0.642487  0.076321 
REER  0.842353 -0.080137 -0.131739  0.076269 
S_SPREAD1 -0.081862 -0.039533  0.710497 -0.043942 
          
 
However the variables that affect SAFSI as a whole are those that are of interest as well as 
variables with loadings that represent how strongly they are associated with each factor 
are selected. Table 4.7 illustrates the factor score summary: 
 
Table 4.7  Factor Score Summary 
Factor Score Summary    
Factor Coefficients:    
 F1 F2 F3 F4 
DLBSPRICE 0.040236 0.380205 0.382191 -0.006451 
DLJALSH 0.594152 0.056973 0.104565 -0.089019 
DLBOP -0.018798 0.003895 0.020938 0.976794 
DLMGDP -0.059595 0.630797 -0.037801 -0.087715 
DLOGDEBT -0.059585 -0.459313 0.242298 -0.11885 
DLOGPSC 0.057997 -0.111638 0.505378 0.068942 
REER 0.563443 -0.045185 -0.034085 0.060537 
S_SPREAD1 -0.003218 -0.095931 0.549627 -0.049629 
 
While DLBOP has a very high loading for factor 4, overall the following variables have 
the most impact on all factors as whole (taking into account that factor 1 and 2 are more 
impactful that factor 3 and 4): DLBSPRICE, DLJALSH, DLMGDP, REER and S_SPREAD 1. 
The SAFSI is constructed using these variables as they correlate to the principal 
components identified using PCA. With regards to REER being a negative coefficient 
(identified by PCA) this is due to the nature that the data is presented. As descriptive stats 
in table 3.4 reveal, REER’s mean has a negative coefficient similarly in figure 4.2 under 
the data and preliminary observations section, the REER trends downwards in times of 
turmoil, this means that depreciation is illustrated by a downturn in figure 4.2  It follows 
then that a depreciation of the rand (lower cash flows) correlates with heightened 
financial stress. 
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4.7 A financial stress index for South Africa 
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The SAFSI does well in identifying known episodes of financial stress, the peaks 
correspond to known financial turmoil events namely the East Asian crisis (1998), the 
‘dot.com’ crisis (2000), the 9/11 events/rand (ZAR) crisis (2001) and global financial crisis 
(2008/2009) The graph suggests that the SAFSI and episodes of financial turmoil are 
highly correlated and that stress is well represented by the chosen variables. Sovereign 
spreads, exchange rate volatility, security market risk and trade finance had the most 
influence over the past two decades on the occurrence of crises in South Africa’.  
 
As a measure of financial stress, the FSI does superbly; it very clearly singles out the 1998 
East Asian crisis as the most stressful period over the last two decades.  The contagion 
effects of the financial disorder that hit Asia from mid 1997 spread rapidly and had a 
profound effect on many emerging market economies including South Africa as massive 
cash outflows led to exchange rate depreciations. A decline in world demand and 
adversely affected commodity prices affected South Africa as it had just re-entered the 
world trade post-apartheid. The second most prominent peak is in 2008/2009 which 
represents the global financial crisis that triggered mayhem in advanced and emerging 
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markets alike. The South African Reserve Bank’s announcement in October 2001 that it 
would enforce the existing exchange control regulations regarding foreign-currency 
trading more strictly and its commitment to closing out the oversold forward book 
(which gave rise to a speculative attack against the rand), spurred a currency crisis in 
2001 illustrated by the third most prominent peak. Interestingly, the SARB’s opting 
against a policy response of intervention as they did in 1998 is received as one of the 
reasons why the consequences of this crisis were limited in comparison to 1998’s crisis. 
(Bhundia & Ricci, 2005) 
 
In contrast, the SARBFSI was formulated as an aggregated index that involves two-level 
construction processes that use variance-equal weight techniques across indicators. 
Variables are standardised before they are aggregated so that only deviations from the 
mean explain the movements in the SARBFSI. It is constructed for the period January 
2006 – January 2015 on a monthly frequency and selects proxies of five dominants 
markets – credit, funding, equity, foreign exchange and real estate. Each market has an 
average of three proxies that serve as explanatory sub-indices for the main index. 
 
 
SARB FSI correlates well with periods of stress particularly 2006 – 2009, it remained 
stable thereafter then increased again from 2014. The increase was mainly driven by the 
domestic equity market and rand volatility and, to a lesser extent, by real-estate prices It 
does not do well in signalling upcoming stress events as is common with financial stress 
indices that are constructed with aggregation models that are not robust. One could say 
that the FSI has an advantage over the SARB’s FSI because it has a longer proven track 
record. The construction of the SARBFSI is first reported in the South African Bank 
Financial Stability Review report of March 2016. 
4.7.1 Analysis of SAFSI against composite business cycle leading indicators 
In South Africa, the Composite Leading Business Cycle Indicator examines the direction 
in which real economic activity is moving, in real time. It is calculated on the basis of the 
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following components: building plans approved, new passenger vehicles sold, commodity 
price index for main export commodities, index of prices of all classes of shares traded on 
the JSE, job advertisements, volume of orders in manufacturing, real M1, average hours 
worked per factory worker in manufacturing, interest rate spread, composite leading 
business cycle indicator of the major trading-partner countries, business confidence 
index, gross operating surplus as a percentage of GDP.  
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                  Figure 4.3 SAFSI and composite business cycle leading indicator 
The SAFSI moves closely with the composite business cycle leading indicator, trends are 
mirrored between the index and the CBLI. They both increase during the beginning of a 
stress cycle and both decrease as the stress cycle ends and moves towards a recovery.  
 
4.8 The relationship between financial stress and economic activity 
4.8.1 VAR Estimation 
The link between macroeconomic variables and episodes of financial stress is covered to a 
large degree in literature. Data that corresponds with the focal index period of 1997 – 
2016 is analysed and VAR estimated using three variables which are key indicators of 
economic activity in South Africa– GDP, CPI inflation and interest rates. The SAFSI is 
transformed to quarterly frequency using the quadratic average method to match its 
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frequency to the quarterly frequency of GDP and CPI. For interest rates averages of the 3-
month interbank rate generated from monthly data obtained from Bloomberg are used.  
 
After log-normalising the data, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips 
Perron (PP) tests as presented in table 4.8 below are used to confirm that returns are not 
stationary. All the transformed series (CPI_1, INT_1 and R_GDP) have a unit root process 
at levels and are integrated of the order I (1).  
 
Table 4.8  ADF and PP results 
  PP ADF  
SAFSI I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 
R_CPI I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 
R_INT I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 
R_GDP I[0] ˟ I[0] ˟ 
Notes:  ˟ indicates statistical significance at 5%  and 
10%.   
  
 
 
The lag length for the VAR (p) model is determination results using model selection 
criteria are recorded in table 4.9.  The Akaike (AIC) suggests three lags while the 
Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) and Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion suggest one lag therefore one 
lag is utilised to study the relationship between the SAFSI and indicators of economic 
activity.   
 
Table 4.9 Lag order selection VAR(q) model 
Lag AIC SC HQ 
    
0 5.998092 6.128651 6.049824 
1 5.222116   5.874912*   5.480774* 
2 5.267298 6.442331 5.732882 
3   5.145479* 6.84275 5.81799 
4 5.224826 7.444334 6.104263 
5 5.515863 8.257608 6.602226 
  Notes: * indicates lag order selected by the criterion 
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Please see Appendix C for VectorAutoregressive results. A t-statistic of above 2 suggests 
significance in the ability of past lags of one variable is helpful  explaining another 
variable, in other words VAR suggest that the following variables in the model have 
statistical significance on the future values of other variables: 
 SAFSI is positively related to its own lag 
 R_CPI is positively related to its own lag and negatively related to one lag of 
R_GDP 
 R_GDP is positively related to one lag of R_CPI 
 R_INT is negatively related to one lag of SAFSI and positively related to its own 
lag. 
 
4.8.2 Impulse responses 
If there is a shock in the market, how long the system will revert to equilibrium? That is 
the main question impulse response functions seek to answer. Since the SAFSI measures 
risk in the overall economy, how long a shock takes to dissipate gives an indication for 
how long there will be a disturbance for. The response of the SAFSI to unexpected 
shocks to other variables is given in the first row. The response of the R_INT to 
unexpected shocks to other variables is given in the second row. The response of the 
R_GDP to unexpected shocks to other variables is given in the third row. R_GDP 
responds positively to unexpected decreases in R_CPI for a short period, while it 
responds negatively to all other variables initially. The response of the R_CPI to 
unexpected shocks to other variables is given in the fourth row. Overall, shocks take a 
little while to decay. 
 
Please refer to Appendix D for Impulse response tables where it is clear that R_CPI has 
the least influence on responses to other variables and that the SAFSI has the most 
impact on R_INT. 
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4.8.3 Granger Causality Test 
The causal relations reveal the direction of return, volatility and conditional asymmetry 
spillover between the FSI and its variables of macroeconomic activity, thus, helping to 
examine how they affect each other. A VAR Granger causality is utilised to capture the 
causal relations (Hylleberg, Engle, Granger, & Yoo, 1990). Explicitly, X is said to 
“Granger-cause” Y if previous values of X contain information that helps predict Y above 
and beyond the information contained in past values of Y alone.   
     Table 4.10. Pairwise Granger Causality 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests    
Lags: 3    
    
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
 R_INT does not Granger Cause SAFSI 72 1.17228 0.3272 
 SAFSI does not Granger Cause R_INT  4.96265 0.0037 
    
 R_GDP does not Granger Cause SAFSI 72 0.53611 0.6592 
 SAFSI does not Granger Cause R_GDP  0.36011 0.782 
    
 R_CPI does not Granger Cause SAFSI 72 0.11504 0.951 
 SAFSI does not Granger Cause R_CPI  0.11711 0.9498 
    
 R_GDP does not Granger Cause R_INT 84 0.47536 0.7004 
 R_INT does not Granger Cause R_GDP  0.56777 0.6379 
    
 R_CPI does not Granger Cause R_INT 84 0.49094 0.6896 
 R_INT does not Granger Cause R_CPI  1.22251 0.3073 
    
 R_CPI does not Granger Cause R_GDP 84 4.24049 0.0079 
 R_GDP does not Granger Cause R_CPI  7.0508 0.0003 
 
p values in table 4.8 results show that SAFSI does granger cause R_INT and R_GDP does 
granger cause R_CPI, that is changes in the SAFSI do cause changes in R_INT and 
changes in R_GDP do cause change in R_CPI. Indeed, it can be concluded that the SAFSI 
has predictive power over interest rates, in other words the SAFSI contains information 
that is relevant in explaining R_INT. The relationship between R_GDP and R_CPI is 
expected. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Financial distress can lead to financial crises, which have significant and persistent 
adverse effects on the real economy, as the 2008/2009 financial crisis confirmed. 
Sustainable growth, acceptable employment levels and social welfare (factors are that 
important to the development of an emerging market) are encouraged by the 
maintenance of financial stability.  The SAFSI is derived from five leading indicators of 
stress that was built using PCA and factor analysis by means of an amass of security 
market risk, banking sector fragility, currency risk, sovereign risk and liquidity risk, that 
is to say increasing uncertainty in financial markets and banking systems, currency 
pressure, a negative outlook on government’s funding ability and underdeveloped 
financial markets lead to increased financial stress in South Africa.  
 
This study quested to answer the following questions: 
 
 Is it optimal considering the ongoing episodes in the financial industry to create 
an index that captures known episodes of financial stress in South Africa by using 
a variation of variables that have been proven to capture stress in other emerging 
markets? 
 If so, can this FSI’s performance be compared to the South African Reserve Bank’s 
FSI in capturing historic crisis events? 
 How well does the SAFSI track South Africa’s composite leading business cycle 
indicator (CLBI) 
 If the above questions are optimally answered, can the proposed FSI predict key 
indicators of economic activity within the South African domain? 
 
To answer the first question, empirical results suggest that it is worthwhile to consider 
the variables that were identified as drivers of financial stress. The index performed well 
in capturing historic events of stress and it did so by using a substantially scaled down 
number of variables in comparison of the South African Reserve Bank’s eleven indicators. 
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Proxies for the SAFSI’s indicators are readily available in high frequency dating back as 
far two decades ago and there is room for considering different proxies for the variables 
that have been identified which may yield an even more meaningful result. 
 
In contrast to the South African Reserve Bank’s FSI, the SAFSI captured a longer history 
of stress events. This means it arguably has a longer proven track record. Although, the 
South African Reserve Bank’s FSI did better in capturing recessionary conditions in South 
Africa in 2014/2015 while the SAFSI index does not signal to any strain at all during this 
period.  
 
The SAFSI also tracks South Africa’s composite leading business cycle indicator since 
leading indicators tend to include variables that have explanatory power over movements 
in the economy, it can be said that the SAFSI does indeed give a sense of the future state 
of the economy. 
 
Empirical result shows that there is merit in using the variables that have pre-selected to 
detect more information about the state of the developing nation’s economies because 
they also seem to offer information about the current and future state of the South 
African economy. Granger causality tests confirm a relationship between changes in the 
SAFSI and R_INT which indicates that the SAFSI is significant in influencing a variable 
of economic activity. Impulse response functions also point to a definite relationship 
between the two – that is, there is a negative response in R_INT to unexpected shocks in 
SAFSI 
 
At the moment, the SAFSI is more useful in assessing whether stress is rising or falling, it 
could be more informative if it had predictive power across more variables. This element 
is not fully explored in this study. Future studies could explore the drawback of PCA – 
that it is not robust and is sensitive to outliers since it minuses squared distances from the 
multidimensional mean. To mitigate this risk, outliers and strong pairings could be 
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scrutinised in the beginning to look for indication of whether data should be “smoothed”. 
Additionally, a second methodology (CISS) could be employed to cater for the lack of 
robustness in the PCA methodology; CISS captures robustness and thus allows for robust 
historical comparisons to be made. It integrates a composite indicator of systemic stress 
into a VAR can have the advantage that it builds on what systemic crises have in 
common, namely instability that spreads widely across markets and institutions.  Further, 
it is useful as a measure of the impact of policy intervention initiatives directed towards 
alleviating financial stress. 
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Appendix A 
 
Variable Proxy 
 
Definition and construction 
 
Data source(s) 
Banking sector 
fragility 
DLBSPRICE 
TED Spread - spread between the 3-month 
interbank lending rate and the 91-day TB rate  
JIBAR, IMF 91day 
TB rate for South 
Africa;  
Bloomberg 
T_SPREAD 
Banking sector equity index variability modelled 
using GARCH (1,1) 
JSE 40, FTSE/JSE 
Africa Bank Index 
- South Africa; 
Bloomberg 
Securities market 
risk 
DLJALSH 
 Time varying volatility stock market volatility 
modelled using the GARCH (1, 1) on FTSE/JSE ASI 
index 
JALSH; 
Bloomberg 
  
Downside beta computed using excess MCSI Barra 
index and JSE all share index  
MCSI Bara Index; 
Bloomberg 
Currency risk 
DZAR_USD 
The exchange rate relative to the most traded 
currency in the world (US $)  
ZAR/USD; 
Bloomberg 
REER 
Real effective exchange rate volatility estimated 
using GARCH 1,1 model 
BIS Indices 
EMPI 
 EMPI (Exchange Market Pressure Index) which 
incorporates exchange rate change, international 
reserves change and the overnight local interest 
rate change relative to the US interest rate 
computed to measure currency risk.  
ZAR/USD, FDFD, 
SARPRT ; 
Bloomberg.                   
RSA Reserves 
minus gold; IMF 
External debt   
12-month growth rate of external debt (long and 
short term debt) computed using South Africa debt 
to GDP multiplied by GDP 
SABTGDIQ  Index 
and SACGDP 
Index; 
Bloomberg 
  DLOGDEBT  
Sovereign risk S_SPREAD1 
Sovereign bond spreads - difference between 
current South Africa 10YR government bond index 
and US 10-year treasury rate yield 
CTZAR10YR, 
USGG10YR;  
Bloomberg 
    
Trade finance DLBOP 
South Africa Balance of Payments Financial 
Account balance 
SABPFABL; 
Bloomberg 
Credit crisis DLOGPSC 
Growth rate of the claims of private sector (i.e 
private sector credit)r as a percentage of broad 
money 
RSA IMF Claims 
on private sector 
Liquidity risk DLMGDP Stock market capitalisation scaled by GDP  
JALSH and 
SACGDP Indices; 
Bloomberg 
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Appendix B 
Correlation 
          
t-Statistic DLBSPRICE  T_SPREAD  DLJALSH  REER  EMPI  DLOGDEBT  DDLBOP  S_SPREAD1  DLOGPSC  DLMGDP  
DLBSPRICE  1 
         
 
-----  
         
           
T_SPREAD  0.007838 1 
        
 
0.122431 -----  
        
           
DLJALSH  0.663561 -0.075406 1 
       
 
13.85489 -1.181243 -----  
       
           
REER  0.242164 -0.042555 0.075016 1 
      
 
3.89876 -0.665339 1.175103 -----  
      
           
EMPI  0.149274 -0.080903 0.08691 
-
0.025896 1 
     
 
2.358158 -1.267894 1.362732 
-
0.404639 -----  
     
           
DLOGDEBT  -0.059883 -0.032068 
-
0.022025 
-
0.012477 -0.0411 1 
    
 
-0.93709 -0.501176 
-
0.344118 
-
0.194919 -0.642 -----  
    
           
DDLBOP  -0.02983 -0.086473 0.082532 0.10861 -0.006 -0.153889 1 
   
 
-0.466161 -1.355827 1.293611 1.706636 -0.0931 -2.432807 -----  
   
           
S_SPREAD1  0.010309 -0.027741 0.166255 0.040344 -0.0257 0.065893 0.00768 1 
  
 
0.161043 -0.433495 2.633631 0.630713 -0.402 1.031517 0.11997 -----  
  
           
DLOGPSC  0.092902 -0.067749 0.141916 
-
0.205939 -0.0206 -0.016518 -0.0029 0.145088 1 
 
 
1.457475 -1.060714 2.239466 
-
3.287338 -0.3224 -0.258048 -0.0447 2.290592 -----  
 
           
DLMGDP  0.218281 -0.074009 0.333675 
-
0.089186 0.1697 -0.138115 0.00577 0.020192 -0.02628 1 
 
3.493911 -1.159238 5.529054 
-
1.398706 2.68976 -2.178299 0.09019 0.315467 -0.41059 -----  
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Appendix C 
 
 SAFSI R_CPI R_GDP R_INT 
     
     
SAFSI(-1)  0.493966  0.038192 -0.002404 -2.639175 
  (0.10213)  (0.04446)  (0.00252)  (0.90507) 
 [ 4.83668] [ 0.85894] [-0.95249] [-2.91598] 
     
R_CPI(-1) -0.000975  0.341547  0.019527 -1.622029 
  (0.25318)  (0.11023)  (0.00626)  (2.24371) 
 [-0.00385] [ 3.09851] [ 3.12029] [-0.72292] 
     
R_GDP(-1)  2.934018 -8.368956 -0.230079  29.96316 
  (4.81316)  (2.09553)  (0.11897)  (42.6544) 
 [ 0.60958] [-3.99371] [-1.93390] [ 0.70246] 
     
R_INT(-1)  0.017661 -0.001830 -0.000310  0.484437 
  (0.01225)  (0.00533)  (0.00030)  (0.10855) 
 [ 1.44178] [-0.34309] [-1.02379] [ 4.46265] 
     
C -0.045694  0.496338  0.020085 -0.491887 
  (0.17442)  (0.07594)  (0.00431)  (1.54569) 
 [-0.26198] [ 6.53617] [ 4.65866] [-0.31823] 
     
     
 R-squared  0.311130  0.236019  0.166212  0.278657 
 Adj. R-squared  0.271196  0.191730  0.117876  0.236840 
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Appendix D 
 
     
      Response of 
SAFSI: 
     
 Period SAFSI R_INT R_GDP R_CPI 
     
      1  0.903413  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
  (0.07426)  (0.00000)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2  0.505655  0.155129  0.060359 -0.000362 
  (0.10286)  (0.09324)  (0.09703)  (0.09392) 
 3  0.220750  0.137099  0.027939  0.010325 
  (0.10683)  (0.09510)  (0.06030)  (0.08474) 
 4  0.074599  0.086869  0.010868  0.003107 
  (0.08718)  (0.06915)  (0.03122)  (0.04450) 
 5  0.011741  0.046387  0.005586 -0.001751 
  (0.06411)  (0.04035)  (0.01311)  (0.01892) 
 6 -0.009751  0.020726  0.002626 -0.002145 
  (0.04280)  (0.02116)  (0.00547)  (0.00814) 
 7 -0.012912  0.006939  0.000729 -0.001357 
  (0.02585)  (0.01207)  (0.00287)  (0.00390) 
 8 -0.009756  0.000842 -9.02E-05 -0.000721 
  (0.01435)  (0.00821)  (0.00182)  (0.00229) 
 9 -0.005788 -0.001139 -0.000277 -0.000338 
  (0.00762)  (0.00572)  (0.00117)  (0.00151) 
 10 -0.002849 -0.001335 -0.000235 -0.000125 
  (0.00419)  (0.00367)  (0.00069)  (0.00095) 
     
      Response of 
R_INT: 
     
 Period SAFSI R_INT R_GDP R_CPI 
     
      1  2.599104  7.572445  0.000000  0.000000 
  (0.90583)  (0.62245)  (0.00000)  (0.00000) 
 2 -1.001234  3.683738  0.561852 -0.601702 
  (0.93012)  (0.87579)  (0.86281)  (0.83379) 
 3 -1.926005  1.380180  0.251450 -0.278997 
  (0.85090)  (0.74556)  (0.48713)  (0.65912) 
 4 -1.603079  0.251196  0.004216 -0.106220 
  (0.67859)  (0.52686)  (0.30926)  (0.37126) 
 5 -0.990138 -0.146527 -0.049413 -0.053137 
  (0.52321)  (0.35549)  (0.18347)  (0.24489) 
 6 -0.502196 -0.208217 -0.039335 -0.024509 
  (0.37770)  (0.24918)  (0.10420)  (0.15225) 
 7 -0.208222 -0.159556 -0.024568 -0.006422 
  (0.25625)  (0.16863)  (0.05448)  (0.08258) 
 8 -0.060581 -0.096046 -0.013643  0.001253 
  (0.16624)  (0.10519)  (0.02665)  (0.04128) 
 9  6.29E-05 -0.048085 -0.006358  0.002873 
  (0.10348)  (0.06149)  (0.01280)  (0.01958) 
 10  0.017172 -0.019456 -0.002230  0.002356 
  (0.06168)  (0.03541)  (0.00653)  (0.00920) 
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Response of 
R_GDP: 
 
 Period SAFSI R_INT R_GDP R_CPI 
     
      1  0.004603  0.007333  0.020583  0.000000 
  (0.00257)  (0.00247)  (0.00169)  (0.00000) 
 2 -0.003868 -0.001574 -0.004075  0.007244 
  (0.00250)  (0.00248)  (0.00256)  (0.00240) 
 3 -0.000129 -0.001781 -0.002520  0.000995 
  (0.00139)  (0.00122)  (0.00156)  (0.00120) 
 4  0.001102 -0.000321  5.37E-05 -0.000485 
  (0.00092)  (0.00063)  (0.00066)  (0.00071) 
 5  0.000662  0.000140  0.000254 -0.000116 
  (0.00055)  (0.00035)  (0.00036)  (0.00029) 
 6  0.000263  0.000130  4.29E-05  4.63E-05 
  (0.00029)  (0.00019)  (0.00015)  (0.00015) 
 7  0.000101  7.98E-05 -5.58E-06  2.13E-05 
  (0.00016)  (0.00011)  (6.2E-05)  (6.9E-05) 
 8  3.40E-05  4.85E-05  2.96E-06 -1.37E-06 
  (8.7E-05)  (6.1E-05)  (2.1E-05)  (2.3E-05) 
 9  2.60E-06  2.61E-05  4.67E-06 -3.19E-06 
  (5.2E-05)  (3.3E-05)  (6.6E-06)  (9.0E-06) 
 10 -8.24E-06  1.10E-05  1.81E-06 -1.36E-06 
  (3.1E-05)  (1.8E-05)  (3.5E-06)  (4.5E-06) 
     
      Response of 
R_CPI: 
     
 Period SAFSI R_INT R_GDP R_CPI 
     
      1  0.008633  0.125997  0.033843  0.370957 
  (0.04572)  (0.04452)  (0.04321)  (0.03049) 
 2 -0.005828 -0.032195 -0.160703  0.126699 
  (0.04677)  (0.04670)  (0.04660)  (0.04220) 
 3  0.051528  0.001363 -0.019507 -0.016262 
  (0.03841)  (0.03447)  (0.02676)  (0.03154) 
 4  0.030636  0.018085  0.015033 -0.012975 
  (0.02550)  (0.01841)  (0.01449)  (0.01280) 
 5  0.007022  0.011721  0.005092 -6.15E-05 
  (0.01727)  (0.00943)  (0.00701)  (0.00696) 
 6 -0.000884  0.004869 -8.07E-05  0.000983 
  (0.01049)  (0.00566)  (0.00319)  (0.00344) 
 7 -0.001960  0.001744 -0.000215 -8.83E-05 
  (0.00555)  (0.00329)  (0.00141)  (0.00121) 
 8 -0.001629  0.000485  4.61E-05 -0.000249 
  (0.00287)  (0.00184)  (0.00050)  (0.00054) 
 9 -0.001103 -3.21E-05  1.25E-05 -0.000103 
  (0.00150)  (0.00109)  (0.00024)  (0.00027) 
 10 -0.000620 -0.000185 -3.37E-05 -2.67E-05 
  (0.00082)  (0.00066)  (0.00013)  (0.00017) 
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Appendix E 
DLBSPRICE 
 
 
DLJALSH 
 
REER 
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